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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that appellants3 claims are barred by the

running of the 30-day statute of limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (2) (a) where
they filed their complaint nearly two and one-half years after the County's sale of the
property in question?
A summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue presents a question of law
which this Court reviews without deference to the trial court. Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,
1112, 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. This issue was preserved in the County's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 141-145), the County's
Supplemental Memorandum (R. 273-277), and its memorandum in support of its Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 585-586).
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that there is no statutory requirement

for the County to provide notice and hearing prior to the sale of County property?
Questions of statutory construction present issues of law which this Court reviews
for correctness. Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 2000 UT 69,1113, 9 P.3d 762, 765.
This issue was preserved in the County's Memorandum in support of its Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 587-599).
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Plaintiffs/appellants have provided references to selected provisions of the County
Land Use Development and Management Act dealing with the preparation, adoption and
amendment of a general plan. Defendant/appellee Weber County does not agree, for the
reasons more fully set forth below, that those statutory provisions are determinative of this
appeal. However, to the extent they are important for the Court to review, the County
respectfully submits that all of the statutory provisions addressing the purpose, preparation,
adoption, amendment and effect of a general plan should be read in context, and therefore
the Court is referred to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-301 through 305, inclusive. In addition,
the Court is referred to the following statutory provisions and Weber County Ordinance
which the County contends are determinative of the issues in this case:
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (2) (a)
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision
is rendered.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or
otherwise acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any
interest in such property that it determines to be in the public interest.
(2) Any property interest acquired by the county shall be held in the
name of the county unless specifically otherwise provided by law.
(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution,
rule, or regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired,
managed, and disposed of.
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Weber County Ordinance § 6-ll-12(B)
B. Real property may be disposed of by public auction, by
listing with a licensed realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by
sealed bid, or otherwise as disposition shall be approved by the
County Commissioners prior to the commencement of
negotiations or other means of disposition. The County
Commissioners may refuse any or all offers or bids.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises from the decision by the Weber County Commission to minimize

a budget shortfall by the sale, and subsequent conveyance of, surplus County real property
to Rulon Jones.1 Because neither the statutes applicable to the sale of County-owned
property nor the County ordinance addressing the disposition of real property require
notice and hearing prior to the sale of such property, the County simply posted an agenda
for a County Commission meeting held on March 11, 1997, that included notice of the
proposed sale of the Property to Jones. The lead plaintiff in this matter, Ben P. Toone,
knew of the sale within days of its occurrence. Despite this knowledge, no complaint was
filed with the district court until nearly two and one-half years after the conveyance of the
Property to Mr. Jones.
Appellants asserted several claims in their complaint, including a declaratory
judgment action and prayer for mandamus. The crux of their position, and the central issue
asserted on appeal, is that the County violated certain provisions of the County Land Use

1

Weber County, together with the Weber County Commission, Commissioners and
County Attorney are collectively referred to herein as the "County."
3

Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, etseq. (the "Act53); and
more specifically those provisions dealing with the preparation, adoption and amendment of
a general plan, by selling what appellants have termed "general plan property" without
notice and hearing.2 Relying on this characterization of the Property, appellants make the
tortured argument that because notice and hearing are required to amend the general plan,
that notice and hearing requirement is somehow imputed to the sale of surplus property
which does not change its use under the general plan.
These claims are based upon the provisions of the Act and are therefore subject to
the statutorily provided appeal in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 on challenges to County
land use decisions which imposes a 30-day statute of limitations.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
After the complaint had been filed, Mr. Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

the action was barred by the 30-day statute of limitations and by principles of laches and
equitable estoppel, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a claim against Mr. Jones, and
that Mr. Jones was a good faith purchaser, not subject to a claim for damages (R. 64-74.)
The County answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings based upon
failure to commence the action within the 30-day statute of limitations and arguing that the
declaratory judgment action and plea for mandamus failed as a matter of law.

2

Appellants have insisted on referring to the Property as "general plan property" or
GP property35 as though it were a term of art. This term implies the existence of a category
of property which is undefined by statute, ordinance or case law. There is no legal
definition of "general plan property35 and no legal or factual significance attaches to the
phrase.

CC
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Appellants responded with the circular argument that the statute of limitations could
not have commenced running because the County's actions which gave rise to the action
were illegal. The trial court initially declined to rule on the motions and requested
supplemental briefing on appellants3 statute of limitations argument (R. 214.) Rather than
limit their briefing to the issue identified by the court, appellants submitted a memorandum
which treated a broader range of issues and argued that discovery was needed to determine
whether there were any fact issues material to the legal questions presented.
After oral argument on May 18, 2000, the trial court took "the motion to dismiss
under advisement.33 (R. 436.) It granted appellants permission to conduct further
discovery and allowed appellees to file an additional response to appellants3 memorandum.
(id.)
On August 21, 2000, appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Jones
responded by renewing his motion to dismiss and the County filed a cross motion for
summary judgment. Appellants filed an additional "supplemental memorandum.33
After oral argument on November 21, 2000, the court took the motions under
advisement (R. 681.) On December 29, 2000, the court issued a lengthy memorandum
decision denying appellants3 motion and granting summary judgment to appellees (R. 682700, attached as Addendum 1.) The court's summary judgment and order of dismissal
were entered January 17, 2001 (R. 701-704, attached as Addendum 2.) Appellants
subsequently initiated this appeal.

5

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah statute provides authority and discretion for counties to sell real property and

to establish procedures for such sales. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242. The statute does not
contain any requirement for notice or hearing prior to the sale of such property. The
ordinance enacted by the County likewise contains no requirement for notice and hearing
(R. 331, 520.)
On October 2,1996, the County adopted by Resolution 46-96 the Ogden Valley
General Plan (R. 509-518.) The plan serves as a guide to "community decisions in land use
development policies" and encourages "development in a responsible and deliberate fashion,
thereby protecting the natural beauty of the Ogden Valley, its natural resources, and its
slopes, ridge lines, view and entry corridors, wildlife habitat, and stream corridors."
(Memorandum Decision, R. 683.)
The property at issue in this matter lies within unincorporated Weber County in the
Ogden Valley (the "Property") (R. 522-24.) The Property is a very small portion (160
acres) of all the publicly and privately owned properties encompassed in the Ogden Valley
General Plan which are designated as appropriate for recreational uses (R. 513-15;
Deposition of David Wilson 59:2-5, R. 605.) As the trial court observed in footnote 2 of
its Memorandum Decision, although the Property was previously designated at one time as
a "Park" on a County map dated January of 1967 (R. 673-74), that map was supplanted by
the Ogden Valley General Plan adopted in 1996 and was never incorporated as part of the
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General Plan (R. 684, n. 2.) There is no evidence that the County ever used or maintained
the Property as a "park" in the traditional sense.
The County posted an agenda which included notice of the proposed sale of the
Property to Jones and, pursuant to its statutory grant of authority, approved the sale of the
Property and conveyed it by quitclaim deed to Rulon Jones on March 11, 1997 (R. 526,
683.) Mr. Jones5 use of the Property is a recreational use consistent with the Ogden Valley
General Plan and does not constitute a change from the designated use of the Property
while owned by the County. (Wilson Dep. pp. 74-77, R. 535.)
While the quitclaim deed might arguably have included conveyance of a County
owned right-of-way to the Property, the County and Mr. Jones have made a judicial
admission that the County did not intend to convey the right-of-way to Mr. Jones (R. 337.)
That judicial admission is binding upon the parties and their successors in interest as a
matter of law, with the result that there was no conveyance of the right-of-way. That
judicial admission was incorporated into the Memorandum Decision of the trial court
(R. 683), and the Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal (R. 702,113).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The 30-day statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 bars all of
appellants3 claims, which are expressly based upon the provisions of the County Land Use
Development and Management Act. Appellants argue that the statute of limitations does
not apply because the action being challenged was not taken in compliance with provisions
of the Act. However, to allow appellants to rely upon selected provisions of the Act dealing
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with general plans without being subject to the statute of limitations imposed by the Act is
facially absurd.
A similar weakness permeates appellants3 circular argument that because the County
allegedly failed to comply with the provisions of the Act, the statute of limitations never
began to run. Logic aside, there is no legal authority to support the conclusion that the
very act giving rise to a cause of action precludes the commencement of the limitation
period applicable to that cause of action.
The County has statutory authority to sell surplus real property and has been granted
broad discretion by the Legislature in establishing the procedures for the sale of such
property. There is no express or implied statutory requirement for notice and hearing
contained in the enabling statute. There is also no constitutional requirement for notice and
hearing prior to the sale of publicly owned property. Whether such a requirement might
make for good public policy is a decision reserved for the legislature. The current language
of the statute, however, suggests a legislative intent that no notice and hearing is required
unless otherwise established by the County's ordinances or rules. As previously noted,
Weber County Ordinance § 6-ll-12(B) did not contain any such requirement at the time
of this sale.
Similarly, the statutory provisions addressing general plans in the Act found at Utah
Code Ann. §§ 17-27-301 - 305 do not impose a notice and hearing requirement on the sale
of publicly owned property. Appellants5 argument is based upon the flawed premise that
the sale of publicly owned property requires a general plan amendment which in turn
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requires statutory notice and hearing. However, where there is merely a change in
ownership of property without an accompanying change in the use of the Property, uses
designated for the Property in the general plan are not implicated and no general plan
amendment is required. In the present case, property owned by the County which is
designated as appropriate for recreational uses continues to be designated as appropriate for
recreational uses under private ownership by Mr. Jones. There is no basis for requiring an
amendment of the general plan, which would trigger statutory notice and hearing
requirements.
Appellants5 arguments with respect to the allegedly improper conveyance of an
accompanying right-of-way are moot. The County and Mr. Jones have judicially admitted
that there was no intent to convey the right-of-way. That judicial admission was
acknowledged in the Court's Memorandum Decision and carried over into the Summary
Judgment and Order. There was, therefore, no conveyance as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS5 CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED BY THE 30-DAY
LIMITATION PERIOD IN §17-27-1001.
Appellants5 claims and arguments, here and before the trial court, focus on the

County's alleged violations of provisions of the Act found in Part 3, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 17-27-301 - 305, related to the preparation, adoption and amendment of a general plan
when it sold the Property. The County has consistently maintained throughout this case
that the sale was made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242 and the related County
ordinance adopted pursuant to that broad delegation of authority, neither of which require
9

notice and hearing prior to the sale of surplus County property. Appellants, however, have
based their claims on alleged violations of the Act in an unsuccessful attempt to infer or
imply a notice and hearing requirement where non exists. By contrast, conspicuously
absent is any attempt by the appellants to explain why this sale does not comply with the
statutory provisions specifically applicable to such transactions in Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-5-242.
It is inherently inconsistent for appellants to expressly attack the sale as having been
completed in violation of the provisions of the Act, and yet simultaneously argue that the
sale was not made under the provisions of the Act and therefore not subject to the Act's
limitations period. They ignore the obvious conclusion, for example, that an alleged failure
by the County Commission to submit the proposed sale to the Planning Commission under
§ 17-27-305 is, by definition, a "decision" which is subject to the 30-day statute of
limitation. They cannot be permitted to expressly assert a claim under the Act while
simultaneously disregarding the statute of limitations expressly provided for claims based
upon the Act.
Appellants claims based upon the general plan provisions in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 17-27-301 - 305 are barred by the 30-day limitation period provided by the legislature
in § 17-27-1001 as a specific avenue for judicial review of claims arising under Chapter 27.
The plain language of the statute reflects a legislative intent to provide for a specific and
relatively narrow judicial review of local land use decisions. Appellants have expressly based
most of their claims on provisions of the Act; and the other activities complained of reflect
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decisions made pursuant to the Act. Either the provisions of the Act relied upon by
appellants do not apply to the sale of the Property to Jones, or appellants5 claims based
upon the Act are subject to the 30-day limitation period. They cannot have it both ways.
Appellants also make the circular argument that since the sale failed to satisfy the
notice and hearing requirements of the Act for the amendment of a general plan, that
somehow precludes triggering the Act's 30-day limitation period. In support, they cite
Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762 and cases cited therein.
Longley is neither factually nor legally similar to appellants3 claims. In Longley and the
cases relied upon by this Court in Longley, there were specific statutory notice requirements
applicable to the procedures involved. In the present matter, there are no statutory notice
requirements specifically applicable to a county's sale of property which is governed by
§ 17-5-242. Appellants5 position relies on the tenuous argument that notice and hearing
requirements applicable to a county's adoption and amendment of a general plan apply to
the sale of surplus county property under an entirely separate statutory provision.
Appellants5 discussion of Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 2001 Ut.App. 55, 23
P.3d 245 is not applicable to this case. Hatch did not involve a statute of limitations
defense. It dealt solely with the issue of whether the Town of Boulder had complied with
enabling statutes in enacting a zoning ordinance. The present matter does not involve a
zoning ordinance. Moreover, plaintiffs have produced no evidence that the County failed to
comply with the statutory provisions of § 17-5-242, the statute from which it derives
authority to sell publicly owned real property.
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The other cases cited by appellants similarly provide no guidance. Lewis v. Kanab
City, 523 P.2d 417 (Utah 1974) dealt with enactment of an ordinance for a special
improvement district which failed to strictly follow the enabling statute; Wells v. Bd. of
Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1997) did not involve a statute
of limitations defense; Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) has no
factual or legal relevance to the present matter.
There is no legal authority for the proposition that a statutory violation which gives
rise to a cause of action simultaneously tolls the very statute of limitations expressly
provided by the Legislature for such claims. Buying into this argument emasculates the
statute of limitations and undermines the important public policy supporting the need for
finality in challenging such decisions. If the alleged violation of a statute which creates a
cause of action also concurrently tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations,
the 30-day limitation becomes superfluous, a result which defies both logic and the rules of
statutory construction. A plaintiff could belatedly bring an action to invalidate a virtually
unlimited range of local governmental decisions, ranging from property sales to zoning
decisions to municipal contracts, regardless of how long ago the action was taken. Because
the very act on which the cause of action is based would toll the limitation period, the
statute would never begin to run. Such a result was certainly not contemplated by the
legislature and when subjected to logical scrutiny, is facially absurd.
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H.

APPELLANTS HAVE NO STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO NOTICE AND A HEARING PRIOR TO THE SALE OF
COUNTY PROPERTY.
The County's authority to sell property comes from an express statutory grant of

authority.
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or
otherwise acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any
interest in such property that it determines to be in the public interest.
(2) Any property interest acquired by the county shall be held in the
name of the county unless specifically otherwise provided by law.
(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution,
rule, or regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired,
managed, and disposed of.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242.
In addition to the specific authority to sell publicly owned property, the County is
also granted broad discretion in establishing the manner for the handling of such
transactions. There is no express or implied statutory requirement for notice or a hearing
prior to the sale of County property. Similarly, the County's ordinance dealing with the
sale of real property, § 6-ll-12(B) (R. 344), does not contain any requirement for notice or
hearing.
Appellants misunderstand the significance of this statute and the County's related
ordinance, § 6-11-12. They conclude that cc[t]hese other provisions are of no help
whatsoever in interpreting Section 305, and it was error for the court to use them as an aid
in statutory construction." (Appellants3 Brief p. 27.) However, the trial court did not use
§ 17-5-242 to construe § 17-27-305. It simply concluded that § 17-5-242 applied to the
13

facts of this case and that statutory construction of § 17-27-305 and related statutes led to
the conclusion that they were inapplicable. As discussed below, that conclusion was legally
correct.
Appellants have never challenged the constitutionality of § 17-5-242. They simply
argue that the statute is inapplicable because the allegedly more specific provisions of the
general plan statutes control the sale of this property. Section 17-5-242 is presumptively
valid and evidences a legislative intent to afford counties broad discretion in conducting the
sale of real property.
A search of case law from all U.S. jurisdictions establishes that a sale of municipal
property may be invalidated for failure to provide notice or a hearing only when the notice
or hearing requirement is specified by statute. E.g., Bagwell v. Town of Brevard, 148
S.E.2d 635, 638 (N.C. 1966) (sale invalid where statutory notice requirements not met);
Bleecker Luncheonette. Inc. v. Wagner. 141 N.Y.S.2d 293, 300 (N.Y.Sup. 1955), affd,
143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (sale proper where statutory notice requirements met.)
At least two courts have addressed the sale of municipal property in the absence of a
statutory notice or hearing requirement and both upheld the validity of the sales. In Hill v.
City of Summit, 166 A.2d 610 (N.J. 1960), taxpayers challenged the sale of city land to a
veterans organization based in part on the failure of the city to provide public notice prior
to the sale. Noting the lack of any statutory requirement for notice, the court concluded
that the city had discretion on whether to provide public notice.
[Pjlaintiffs allude to the fact that the sale was made without public
notice. Nowhere in [New Jersey statute] is there a requirement of
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public notice prior to a conveyance under the said statute, nor is there
any provision in this statute which makes it subject to [another
statute], relied on by plaintiffs as the basis for the requirement of
notice. The conveyance was in accordance with the requirements of
[the governing statute] and there is no constitutional provision which
prohibits municipalities from making sales and conveyances unless
public notice is given. This is left to the sound discretion of the
Legislature.
Hill at 617. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached a similar result in Ravenelle v. City
ofWoonsocket, 54 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 1947) (absent a provision of statute or ordinance
the property sale details "are apparently left to the discretion of the city council.53)
A review of state and federal case law confirms the conclusion of the Hill court that
there is no constitutional prohibition on conveying municipal property without public
notice or a hearing. To establish that notice or hearing is constitutionally required, plaintiffs
must first demonstrate a property or liberty interest which is recognized by law as rising to
the level of constitutional protection.
We engage in a two step inquiry: (1) Did the individual possess a
protected interest to which due process protection was applicable? (2)
Was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process?
Hennigh v. City of Shawnee. 155 R3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
See also Lander v. Indus. Common of Utah. 894 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah App. 1995) (plaintiff
must demonstrate property interest which rises to the level of constitutional protection). At
the trial court, appellants made only one conclusory allegation of a protected property right:
"The public had rights of access, use and benefit in the WCPP which cannot be abrogated
absent 'procedural fairness5. . ." (R. 502.) This alleged right is not recognized by state or
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federal law as being entitled to due process protection. No Utah case law recognizes such
an abstract right.
"The existence of a property interest is defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law." Driggins v. City of Oklahoma
City, 954 R2d 1511,1513 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
c

To have a property interest... a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or

desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92
S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
The Utah Legislature expressly did not recognize the type of property right asserted
by plaintiffs when it statutorily authorized counties to sell publicly owned property without
imposing a notice or hearing requirement. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242.
Appellants rely on two cases to demonstrate their alleged right to notice and hearing
on the sale of surplus public property. They cite Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356 P.2d 631,
636 (Utah 1960) for the proposition that this Court has "upheld the requirement of notice
for the sale of public property." (Appellants3 Brief p. 41.) Appellants5 conclusion is
inconsistent with parts of the cited paragraph which they chose to omit. For example, the
Stone court recognized that the city could have used a procedure for selling the Property
other than publicizing and holding a hearing on the disposal of the Property.

cc

[T]he City

may have followed some other method than it did . . ." Stone at 636. The language on
which appellants rely is therefore simply dicta arising in a completely different context. In
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Stone, the court did not establish notice and hearing as a requirement for sale of surplus
land. It merely held that the City's publication of the disposition proposal and holding of a
public meeting were appropriate.
Moreover, two observations by the Stone court undermine appellants5 arguments
with respect to the sale of the Property. Stone arose under a different statutory context
applicable to municipalities. The Stone court noted, however, that a statute which confers
powers upon cities in relation to "streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks,
airports and public grounds" and authorizes a city to vacate them by ordinance did not
apply to the sale of municipal real property, specifically the city's public safety building.
Stone at 636. The statutory language noted by the court is similar to that relied upon by
appellants. The Stone court also looked to the language of the applicable statutes and
observed that there was no "express provision in our statutes which would prohibit the
procedure followed here.53 Id. Similarly, there is no express provision in the statutory
language empowering the County to sell property which imposes the procedural
requirement for notice and hearing.
Appellants5 argument based upon W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City. 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990) suffers a fundamental analytical flaw. That case
does not deal with a general right of the public to notice and hearing but with the specific
property rights of individual property owners which might be subjected to the exercise of
eminent domain powers by a redevelopment agency. Appellants5 attempted expansion of
the due process protection of this narrow, clearly identified individual property right to a
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Appellants have failed to demonstrate a specific, recognized individual property
interest meriting constitutional protection. Contrasted with the specific provisions
applicable to RDAs, the legislature has imposed no such requirement for notice or hearing
prior to the County's sale of publicly owned property, statutorily leaving the details of such
sales to the County's discretion. There is simply no statutory or constitutional requirement
for notice or hearing prior to the sale of county property.
III.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING GENERAL PLANS DO NOT
IMPOSE A NOTICE OR HEARING REQUIREMENT UPON THE
COUNTY PRIOR TO THE SALE OF PUBLICLY OWNED PROPERTY,
To avoid the inescapable legal conclusion that there is no constitutional or express

statutory right to notice and a hearing prior to the sale of property owned by the County,
appellants seek to impose a notice requirement by invoking the general plan provisions of
Chapter 27, Part 3 of the Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-301 - 305. They urge the Court
to find that those provisions of the Act, including publication of notice, holding a hearing
and submission to the planning commission, apply to the sale of all publicly owned
property. To do so, the Court must accept three questionable propositions that are
fundamental to the argument. First, the Court must recognize a newly created category of
"general plan property" to which it must then attach a legal significance which does not
presently exist. Second, it must read portions of the general plan statutes selectively and out
of context. Third, it must ignore the legislative purpose behind the general plan provisions
of the Act and engage in judicial legislation by creating a broad public policy which is not
evidenced by a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the statute. The Court
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should respectfully decline this invitation to violate the separation oi p< invade the province ol the legislature.
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E.£f.j Showah v. Planning &: Zoning coiiim'n of the City of Bridgeport, 2000 WL
, M)59 (Conn. Super. 2000) (general plan to "control and direct the use and development
nt nmnerty33); County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 66,
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Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 947 P.2d 1208, 1214-15 (Wash. 1997). It is a
"recommendation of the most desirable use of land.35 Theobald v. Bd. of Count?/ Comm'rs,
644 P.2d 942, 948 (Colo. 1982). The key here is that a general plan deals with the uses of
property, not the ownership of property.
Appellants apparently do not understand the nature of "use" as it applies to the
statutes upon which they rely. They argue that "it was error for the trial court to construe
the cuse3 of the Property prior to the sale to Jones as simply 'recreational,5 when it had many
other 'uses' as well." (Appellants3 Brief p. 15.) With respect to general plans, "use33 is a
term of art. Counties are granted broad discretion to promote a wide range of pviblic policy
goals and objectives in a comprehensive general plan as outlined in Utah Code Ann.
§§ 17-27-301 - 302. Consistent with that statutory delegation of authority, Weber County
has identified a number of public policy goals and objectives which are intended to protect
the natural beauty and character of the Ogden Valley including, but not limited to, air
quality and water resources, open space and sensitive lands, wildlife habitat, etc. (R. 509518). While generally discussing recreational uses as the best means of promoting the
protection of those natural characteristics, the plan does not distinguish between public and
private ownership as a means to accomplish those objectives.

77 (Cal.App. 1999) review denied (general plan embodies "fundamental land use
decisions33); Fritz v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 986 S.W.2d 456, 459
(Ky.App. 1999) review denied (general plan considers current land uses in addressing future
development): Osiecki v. Town of Huntington. 565 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (N.Y.App. 1991)
(general plan is compilation of land use policies).
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W h e t h e r the general plan statutes dictate requirements for the sale of C o u ntv owned
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IV 2d 206, 2 0 3 . T h e fact that die parties ask the Court to draw very different inferences

from the statutory language at issue supports a determination that there is some ambiguity
in that language.
The intent and purpose of the general plan statutes is to provide for a plan for land
uses and future development and to preserve the integrity and functionality of that plan.
Any question as to the meaning of the general plan statutes must be evaluated in light of
this purpose and intent.
Appellants begin their analysis with two flawed assumptions. The first, discussed
above, is that there is a legal significance to the term "general plan property3' which attaches
to the Property. For the reasons discussed above, this assumption lacks merit. The second
assumption, implied rather than explicit, is that the provisions of the Ogden Valley General
Plan specifically contemplates the continued public ownership of the Property, rather than
simply identifying various goals and objectives with respect to the contemplated future use
of the Property, whether under public or private ownership. These flaws undermine, from
the beginning, appellants3 arguments with respect to the applicability of the general plan
statutes to the sale of publicly owned property.
A.

SALE OF THE PROPERTY WHICH DID NOT CHANGE ITS USE
FROM RECREATIONAL TO ANOTHER USE DID NOT
REQUIRE AN AMENDMENT TO THE GENERAL PLAN. THE
NOTICE AND HEARING REQUIREMENTS FOR A GENERAL
PLAN AMENDMENT ARE THEREFORE INAPPLICABLE TO
THIS SALE,

The provisions of Tide 3 of the Act all deal with general plans. The tide to
§ 17-27-305 is "Effect of the plan on public uses.55 The express intent of the provisions of
§ 17-27-305, therefore, is to deal with the general plan in the context: of public uses. The
23

language of the statute, "selling
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where no change in "use is anticipated from what is otherwise allowable under the general
pla n? .Appellants have never provided a satisfactory answer to that critical question. ; lie

statute cannot be reasonably interpreted as requiring an amendment to the general plan
where there is no change in the anticipated or designated use of the Property. Such a
construction is simply "nonsensical and absurd35 and is not permitted by the rules; of
statutory construction. Perrine at 1292. If there is no basis for amending the general plan
to designate the Property for a different use, no such amendment is required. If an
amendment is not required, the statutory notice and hearing provisions do not come into
play.
The Property, along with a substantial portion of other property within the Ogden
Valley, both publicly and privately owned, is designated for recreational uses. The
recreational use designation in the general plan makes no distinction between the ownership
of the properties. All similarly situated properties are designated for the same recreational
use. The general plan identifies only the broad public policy goals and objectives sought to
be advanced through the anticipated recreational use of those properties, regardless of the
nature of their ownership. The Deputy County Attorney recognized this distinction with
respect to whether a general plan amendment was required.
If this property had been listed under the general plan, not just as
recreational use but as public recreational and not included private
recreational property as well, then it may have triggered an
amendment to the general plan.
(Deposition of David Wilson 73:1-5, R. 560.)
The County's sale of the Property to Mr. Jones did not change the use of the
Property from the recreational use designated in the general plan. Mr. Jones may only use
the Property for recreational purposes consistent with both the general plan and existing
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zoning. If he wishes to change that use of the Propertw h<- must apply for a general pla n
amendment and zoning change, which wouk; «cqu;re notice and nearint;
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|)iop» iiv is inot only relevant but critical to the issue of whether a general plan amendment is
required under any circumstances, not just the sale of publicly owned property. A si mple
change in ownership without a change in the use of property does not trigger the need for a
general plan amend nieiit,
Despite ill* l.ivi ili i i lie sale of die Property did not change its use, thereby
triggering the need for a general plan amendment, appellants stretch their already tenuous
position to argue that the notice and hearing requirements for general plan amendments
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* --4 are simply not triggered ,

THE COUNTY'S SALE OE THE PROPERTY W i i H O U l
REFERRAL TO THE PLANNING COMMISSION r>OF<! x
M AKE THE SALE INVALID,

AppetLiiii. jtpiiiiic in i li.it the sale is void for failure of the County Commission to
refer the proposed sale to die Planning Commission lacks statutory and legal support.
OA

Aside from such a referral being inconsistent with the apparent purpose of § 17-27-305,
there is no requirement by statute or local ordinance for the Planning Commission to
review a proposed sale of County property.
The powers of a planning commission are specifically enumerated in § 17-27-204.
There is no provision in that section which assigns any role to the Planning Commission in
the proposed sale of county-owned property. There is, however, statutory authority for the
planning commission to review and give recommendations with respect to general plan
amendments and zoning ordinances.
The only reasonable interpretation of § 17-27-305 is that where publicly owned
property is designated under the general plan as intended specifically for public use, its sale
may result in a change of use which requires a general plan amendment. In that case, the
provisions of § 17-27-305 are triggered, requiring referral to the planning commission
along with notice and hearing for a general plan amendment. However, the sale of a parcel
of publicly owned property not otherwise designated under the general plan as intended
specifically for public use, where no change in the fundamental nature of the use is
anticipated, does not require a general plan amendment. In that case, neither referral to the
planning commission nor notice and hearing of a general plan amendment are mandated.
The County's sale of the Property to Jones clearly falls within the latter scenario. There is,
therefore, no notice and hearing requirement mandated by the general plan statutes.
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(Utah 1988) (legislature's omission indicated legislature's intent); Traylor Bros.?
Inc./Frunin-Coliit n v. Overton. 736 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah App. 1987) ("Under ordinary

principles of statutory construction, we must assume that the legislature advisedly omitted
the word "willful5 and that the statute evidences the legislature's intent [that willfulness not
be an element].")
While the relative merits of requiring notice and a public hearing prior to the sale of
publicly owned property undoubtedly makes for a spirited public policy debate as reflected
by the positions of the parties in this case, the balancing of those policy interests is a matter
for the legislature. The trial court agreed.
The court is sympathetic with plaintiffs3 position that it is desirable
that sales of publicly owned real property occur openly, through
meaningful notices and hearings to the public, and perhaps that is a
matter that the legislature ought to review. However, this court may
not substitute its judgment for the legislature's and impose a
requirement of notice and hearing where none exists under the law.
This court has the responsibility to interpret the law only and then to
follow it.
(Memorandum Decision, R. 698.)
The fact that there is no notice or hearing requirement in § 17-5-242 is suggestive of
a legislative intent that no notice or hearing is required. The legislature has granted
counties broad discretion in formulating procedures for the sale of county propeny. Absent
clear evidence of intent to the contrary, it must be assumed that the legislature intended to
grant discretion as to whether to include a notice and hearing requirement in those
procedures. If the legislature intends otherwise, it can and should amend the statutory
language. It is appropriate for the Court to adhere to its traditional reluctance to interfere
with that legislative prerogative.
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the Property.
More tiiiifUiiLiiiiith , ilu1 iJiiili'i lyiiij1 i\,sn<s iiui .nil™, iiinns n nh rcspm in the
right-of-wa
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CONCLUSION
There is no statutory or constitutional requirement for notice and hearing prior to
the sale of county-owned property. The general plan provisions of the County Land Use
Development and Management Act do not impose such a requirement on this sale. There
was no change in the use of the Property which would trigger the need for a general plan
amendment. The notice and hearing requirements for a general plan amendment therefore
have no application to these facts and circumstances.
Despite the undisputed fact that the sale of the Property was public knowledge and
specifically known by at least one of the appellants within days of the sale, no legal action
challenging the sale was commenced until approximately two and one-half years after the
conveyance. The substance of this litigation, based upon the claims asserted by appellants,
centers on the applicability of the general plan provisions in §§ 17-27-303, -304, and -305.
The action is therefore barred by the running of the 30-day statute of limitations in
§ 17-27-1001.
The trial court therefore correctiy determined that the County's sale of the Property
was valid as a matter of law. The County respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's decision.
DATED this

^ C t a y of September, 2001.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

By.
Jody KyBurnet!
Attorneys for Weber County Appellees
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OFCWEBER COUNTS
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
Ben P. Toone, Kent D. Fuller, Robert J.
Fuller, Haynes R. Fuller, and Roger E.
Cannon,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Memorandum Decision

Weber County, a political subdivision; the
Weber County Commission; Weber County
Commissioners Glen Burton, Ken Bischoff
and Camille Caine; Mark DeCaria, Weber
i
County Attorney; Rulon Jones, an individual,
and John and Jane Does 1-10

Case No. 990907314
Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment against the defendants, and the defendants file
cross-motions for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.1 The court grants summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND
In February 1997, Weber County sold to Rulon Jones ("Jones") 160 acres of undeveloped
real estate known as the Wolf Creek Park Property ("the property"), in an effort to extinguish a
budget shortfall. The property is west of the Powder Mountain Ski Resort in the Ogden Valley or

defendant Rulon Jones filed a motion to dismiss, or a motion on the pleadings. He later
filed affidavits in support of his motion. Under rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if the
court considers "matters outside the pleadings," the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56.
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the environs of Huntsville, Eden, and Ogden Canyon of Weber County. Plaintiffs allege,
essentially, that the county violated certain statutes in selling the property and that the county
sold the property for inadequate compensation. They ask the court to void the transaction.
Defendants deny plaintiffs' allegations and seek dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court should consider only those facts
"material to the applicable rule of law." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
Accordingly, the following undisputed facts are material to and dispositive of the legal issues:
1.

Under the County Land Use Development and Management Act ("the act"), Utah

Code Ann. § 17-27-101, et. seq., the Weber County Commission adopted a General Plan ("the
plan") for the Ogden Valley with Resolution 46-96 on October 2,1996.
2.

The resolution states that the plan shall serve to guide community decisions in

land use development policies and to encourage development in a responsible and deliberate
fashion, thereby protecting the natural beauty of the Ogden Valley, its natural resources, and its
slopes, ridge lines, view and entry corridors, wildlife habitat, and stream corridors.
3.

The county posted an agenda for a county commission meeting held on March 11,

1997, that included notice of the sale of the property to Jones. Following approval of the sale in
the county commission meeting, Weber County conveyed the property to Jones by quitclaim
deed on March 11,1997. Jones recorded that deed on March 25,1997.
4.

Under the quitclaim deed, the county also inadvertently conveyed a 30-foot public

right-of-way. The county and Jones made a judicial admission that the right-of-way was not
conveyed and remains with Weber County, as reflected in the original conveyance to the county.
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5.

The county did not give any other public notice or a hearing before selling the

property to Jones.
6.

The plan covers the property and permits a recreational use.

7.

Before the sale, the property had a recreational use, including hunting. Following

the sale, it has a recreational use,2 including hunting. Jones limits the hunting, however, to
persons who pay a fee.
8.

Plaintiffs did not commence this action until October 25, 1999, more than two and

one-half years after the county conveyed the property.
ISSUES
The motions for summary judgment present the following questions: (1) Are plaintiffs'
claims barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 17-271001(2)(a)? (2) Does state law or constitutional due process require the county to give public
notice and to hold a public hearing before selling the property to Jones?
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
"Summary judgment is warranted when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Shattuck-Owen v.
Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, ^9 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Where the parties assert a
2

To their supplemental memorandum filed with the court on December 22,2000,
plaintiffs attached a map prepared originally by the Weber County Planning Commission in 1967
and reprinted again by the planning commission in 1984. The legend of the map indicates
"Ogden Valley Study" and gives a "Physical Development Plan Interpretation" by using different
colors on the map. Under the legend, the map shows that the property was designated as a park.
When the county adopted the general plan in 1996, however, nothing under the plan designated
the property as a park or implemented this map to show its use restricted to a park.
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factual dispute, summary judgment is appropriate only when, viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, the moving party is nevertheless entitled to
judgment." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1992); see Burton v.
Exam Or. Indus. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, Y (citations omitted) ("Before
granting summary judgment, a court must, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law/'). Summary judgment is not precluded "simply
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted."
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted).
In this case, both parties are in agreement that there is no dispute as to any material facts,
and each side asks the court to rule as a matter of law on the issues presented in the memoranda.3
II. Statue of Limitations Under § 17-27-1001
Plaintiffs seek judicial review of the county's decision to sell the property to Jones under
the County Land Use Development and Management Act, found in Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-

3

There is a facial dispute of fact in plaintiffs' reply memorandum, p. 2, concerning the
recreational use of the property after the sale of the property. Plaintiffs argue that a change in
ownership intrinsically changes the use from one of unfettered public use to restricted public use.
Following a telephone conference with counsel on the record on December 19, 2000, the court
finds that there is no dispute that the property was used for recreational purposes before the sale
and continues to be used for recreational purposes after the sale. The court recalls both sides
taking that position during arguments on the motions for summary judgment as well. The court
concludes that plaintiffs' denial in his memorandum is really a legal argument, not a fundamental
factual dispute. Therefore, the court concludes as a matter of law, based on the purposes of the
act, that it is immaterial under the act whether it is a private recreational use or a public
recreational use, so long as the nature of the use conforms to the general plan. Accordingly, the
court entered finding no. 7 as an undisputed fact earlier in this decision.
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101, et seq.4 Defendants assert that the statute of limitations in § 17-27-1001 limits this court's
review of county land use decisions to a period of 30 days after the county has made its decision.
The court agrees. The 30-day statute of limitations reads as follows:
(2)(a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise
of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The court shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
This limitation period promotes the public policy of making land use decisionsfinal.The
statute of limitations forecloses the plaintiffs' claims, allowing Jones to rely on the county's
conveyance and proceed to use the property consistent with the pre-existing use or to seek a
change in land use by the procedure provided under the act, without fear of a challenge to the
sale.
To avoid the application of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs offer the following

4

Although plaintiffs attempt to characterize their claims as seeking a declaration of "their
rights and other legal relations," to avail themselves of the lengthier statute of limitations found
in the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq., plaintiffs premise all their
other arguments under the County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code
Ann. 17-27-101 etseq. Thus the statute of limitations under § 17-27-1001 governs the county's
decisions under that act. Furthermore, since the County Land Use Development Act is more
specific than the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court applies the more specific statute of
limitations. See Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (applying a two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations in favor of a more general provision not specifically aimed at
medical malpractice claims. Moreover, plaintiffs may not re-characterize their claims in a
different fashion in order to avoid the application of this more specific statute and escape the
closure it gives to land use decisions. See DOIT, Inc. v. louche Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 842
(Utah 1996) (rejecting re-characterization of tort claim as a contract claim to avoid limitation
bar).
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arguments: 1) that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations; and 2) that state law and
constitutional due process required both the Weber County Planning Commission and the Weber
County Commissioners to give public notice and to hold a public hearing before selling the
property, and because the county failed to give the public notices and to hold the public
meetings, the statute of limitations was tolled.
Such defenses lack statutory or case law support, as explained below. In this case, the
county commission made a decision to convey the property to Jones on March 11, 1997. The
court rules as a matter of law that the statute of limitations began to run on that date, barring
plaintiffs' claims, brought more than two and one-half years after the county's decision to sell the
property.
III. DISCOVERY RULE
Plaintiffs urge the court to apply the discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations.
To invoke the discovery rule, plaintiffs must show that the county affirmatively concealed their
cause of action or that exceptional circumstances exist. See Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, % 10, 998
P.2d 262 (Utah 2000); Horn v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 102 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). The county's concealment must be such as to preclude a reasonable plaintiff from
discovering the claim earlier and bringing it within the statutory period. See Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,1130 (Utah 1992). Moreover, the concealment must involve a claim
of equitable estoppel or plaintiffs must show that, "under the circumstances, [they] acted in a
reasonable manner." Warren at 1129-30.
Plaintiffs provide no legal or factual basis upon which the court may toll the statute.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Ben Toone learned of the conveyance within just a few days after it
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occurred, thereby refuting the notion that the county affirmatively concealed the transaction from
at least him. Further, Jones recorded the deed on March 25, 1997, after the county conveyed the
property on March 11,1997, thus, arguably, imparting constructive notice of the conveyance on
March 25,1997. In passing, the court recalls further, in other hearings, that there seemed to be no
dispute that newspapers reported the sale when it occurred, though this is not a specific finding
of the court.
Plaintiffs contend that Deputy County Attorney David Wilson had a responsibility at the
outset to protect the public's interest and challenge the sale. They assert that he instead "misled
Ben Toone by telling him that the sale was 'legal.'" This contention is untenable. First, it is
undisputed that Mr. Wilson did not conceal the conveyance, the event triggering the statute of
limitations. Second, nothing precluded Mr. Toonefromobtaining a second legal opinion, which,
in hindsight, might have made the statute of limitations issue moot, assuming he acted timely.
Third, based on the analysis in this decision, the court believes that Mr. Wilson gave a sound
legal opinion.
The court finds no factual or legal foundation for tolling the statute of limitations for
"exceptional circumstances" either, certainly nothing that would outweigh the clear legislative
intent to provide a limited period for judicial review of local land use decisions or outweigh the
strong public policy behind the limitation period of lending predictability and finality to county
land management transactions.
Finally, none of the plaintiffs contends that he did not discover the sale until 30 days prior
to the filing of their complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs present no justification for waiting more
than two and one- half years to file their suit.
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IV, Sale of Property without Notice and Hearing
Plaintiffs argue that the county's failure to give statutory public notice and hearing before
making the sale to Jones tolled the limitation period. They further maintain that the county's
failure to do so implicated constitutional due process concerns. The court disagrees with both of
these premises. It is undisputed that the county did not provide any notices or hearings before the
public, except for posting an agenda referencing the county's consideration to sell the property to
Jones and an open county commission meeting on March 11, 1997, in which the decision to sell
was made. The court agrees with the defendants that no other notices or public hearings were
required by state or local law. Further, the plaintiffs have no individual interest in the subject
property to implicate constitutional due process concerns.
The law will invalidate the sale of municipal real property only when a statute requires
notice and hearing and no notice or hearing was given, Bagwell v. Town of Brevard, 148 S.E.2d
635, 635 (N.C. 1966), or when constitutional due process has been violated, Lander v. Indus.
Comm n of Utah, 894 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah App. 1995).
A. Statutory Notice and Hearing Not Required
No Utah statute or county ordinance requires public notice and hearing concerning the
sale of surplus real property when the sale involves only a change in ownership and not a change
in land use.1 Under Utah law, a county may sell property and its county commissioners may
establish the manner of selling publically owned property:
(1) The county may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, or otherwise
acquire and dispose of any real or personal property or any interest in such
x

As used in this ruling, "surplus real property" means real property not used by the
county for any other publicly dedicated use, such as a park or street.
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property that it determines to be in the public interest.

(3) The county legislative body shall provide by ordinance, resolution, rule, or
regulation for the manner in which property shall be acquired, managed, and
disposed of.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242.2 This statute contains no express or implied statutory requirements
for notice or hearing to the public. Accordingly, the court can only infer that the legislature left
the decision of whether or not to give notice or a hearing before selling surplus real property to
the discretion of the county commission in making its ordinances.
Pursuant to the grant of authority under § 17-5-242, Weber County passed an ordinance
dealing with the selling of real property. It contains no express requirements of notice to and
hearing before the public before selling:
6-11-12 Disposal of Surplus Property.

B. Real property may be disposed of by public auction, by listing with a
licensed realtor, by negotiation, by trade, by sealed bid, or otherwise as
disposition shall be approved by the County Commissioners prior to the
commencement of negotiations or other means of disposition. The County
Commissioners may refuse any or all offers or bids.
Weber County Ordinance § 6-11-12. This ordinance permits the county commissioners to sell
real property through a variety of methods, approved by them. Some of these methods might
naturally involve public notice, but others might not. In any event, this ordinance does not
require a notice to and a hearing before the public before the county can sell real property.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs attempt to challenge the county's sale of the property to Jones by

Effective May 1,2000, this section was renumbered to § 17-50-312.
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claiming that it failed to comply with notice and hearing provisions found in the County Land
Use Development and Management Act. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, et. seq. Weber County
acknowledges that it did not give any notices or hearings under the act because they were not
necessary. Plaintiffs premise the application of the notice and hearing required under the act on a
change in ownership that occurred when the county conveyed the property to Jones. They begin
their argument with § 17-27-305:
(1) After the legislative body has adopted a general plan or any amendments to the
general plan, no street, park or other public way, ground, place, or space, no
publicly owned building or structure, and no public utility, where publicly or
privately owned, may be construed or authorized until and unless:
(a) it conforms to the plan; or
(b) it has been considered by the planning commission and, after receiving the
advice of the planning commission, approved by the legislative body as an
amendment to the general plan.
(2) (a) Before accepting, widening, removing, extending, relocating, narrowing,
vacating, abandoning, changing the use, acquiring land for, or selling or leasing any
street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure, the legislative body
shall submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations.
(b) If the legislative body approves any of the items contained in Subsection (a), it shall
also amend the general plan.
Plaintiffs focus their argument in subsection (2). They contend that in subsection (2)(a),
the statute requires Weber County, "[b]efore . . . selling . . . any . .. public way, ground, place, or
property . . . , " to "submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and
recommendations." Further, as provided in subsection (2)(b), "[I]f the legislative body approves
any of the items contained in Subsection (a) [i.e., the sale to Jones], it shall also amend the plan."
Thus, argue plaintiffs, before selling the property to Jones, the proposed sale should have been
submitted to the planning commission for its review and recommendations to the county
commission. Then, if the county commission approved the sale, it should have also amended the
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plan before selling the property to Jones, requiring further public notice and hearing.
Plaintiffs maintain that this process would have provided two separate notices to the
public and two public hearings, one before the planning commission and a second one before the
county commission. Section 17-27-304 of the act provides that the "legislative body may amend
the general plan by following the procedures required by § 17-27-303," the procedure used
initially in adopting the plan. Section 17-27-303(l)(3) requires the planning commission to give
"reasonable notice of [a] public hearing at least 14 days before the date of [a] hearing." After that
hearing, the planning commission passes its recommendation on to the county commission.
Then, § 303(3)(a) requires the county commission to hold a hearing and to provide "reasonable
notice of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing."
In summary, plaintiffs contend that before Weber County sold the property to Jones, state
law required the county to amend the general plan, requiring two 14-day notices to the public and
two public hearings. These hearings, assert plaintiffs, would have informed the public of and
would have permitted comment on the sale and its purchase price.
Undergirding plaintiffs' analysis, however, is the erroneous premise that a change in
ownership of surplus real property requires a change in the general plan. Plaintiffs defend this
premise by pointing selectively to language in subsection (2)(b) referencing the selling of the real
property, taking it out of the context of the whole section, and then connecting it to requirements
of public notices and hearings that do not apply. Plaintiffs' interpretation of § 305 is
unreasonable because it contravenes the legislative intent and the coherence of the section, read
as a whole, and of the act itself.
The rules of statutory construction must be followed to correctly understand § 305.
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Fundamentally, the court must construe this section to give effect to the legislature's underlying
intent:
[T]his Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to
give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. Generally, the best indication of
that intent is the statute's plain language. Thus, we will interpret a statute
according to its plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute. In
addition, statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render
some part of the provision nonsensical and absurd.
Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). While § 305 (2)(a) plainly
references selling ground, "statutory . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render some part
of the provision nonsensical or absurd." Id. Because any action under subsection (2)(a) requires a
plan amendment under subsection (2)(b), under plaintiffs' interpretation, the county must amend
the plan to reflect merely Jones' ownership of the property, although the use of the property
remains the same. The court disagrees this interpretation. Plaintiffs' interpretation ignores both
subsection (1) of § 305 and an important rule of statutory construction that "statutory enactments
are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Millett v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). Further, "a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal
fashion but as a comprehensive whole." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037, 1045
(Utah 1991).
Subsection (1) states that no authorization of the ground may occur unless "(a) it
conforms to the plan; or (b) it has been considered by the planning commission and, after
receiving the advice of the planning commission, approved by the legislative body as an
amendment to the general plan." Read only by itself, without looking at the title to the section or
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the act as a whole, the language in § 305 of "until or unless: (a) it conforms to the plan" is
ambiguous. It is unclear in what way the pronoun "it" conforms to the plan.
Other rules of statutory construction assist with this ambiguity. Though not a part of the
statute, it is appropriate to consider a statute's title if the language of the statute creates an
ambiguity. Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). The title to § 305 reads "Effect of
the plan on public uses''' (emphasis added). Another rule of construction is to look to the intent of
the act itself. See Evans v. Utah, 963 P.2d 177,184 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted) ("When we
interpret statutes, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.") In so doing, it becomes plain that the general plan
referenced in § 305 deals with property uses, not property ownership. Under § 17-27-103
(l)(h)(I), "General Plan" means a document that a county adopts to set forth general guidelines
for proposed future development of land within the county. Subpart (ii) of the same section states
that "General Plan" includes what is also commonly referred to as a "master plan."
The Weber County Commission adopted a general plan for the Ogden Valley with
Resolution 46-96 on October 2,1996. The resolution states, in sum, that the plan shall serve as a
guide for community decisions in development and land use policies to encourage development
in a responsible and deliberate fashion, thereby protecting the natural beauty of the Ogden
Valley, its natural resources, and its slopes, ridge lines, view and entry corridors, wildlife habitat,
and stream corridors. Nowhere in the state act or in the county resolution is the general plan
concerned with ownership of property, which is the predicate of plaintiffs' interpretation of §
305. The general plan, under state law and county ordinance, deals only with uses of property, as
defendants observe, and serves as a guide for development of real property consistent with the
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identified uses to ensure integrity and function of the plan, regardless of public or private
ownership.
Thus, going back to interpreting § 305(l)(a), and more particularly the legislative intent
of the phrase "until or unless: (a) it conforms to the plan," it is clear to this court that this section
addresses land uses that conform or do not conform to the plan. Subsection (1), therefore,
authorizes the county commission to approve a disposition of the ground if the use conforms to
the plan; otherwise, the planning commission must consider the non-conforming use and the
county commission must approve the non-conforming use as a plan amendment.
Further, from a practical perspective, when the land use is not an issue before the county
commission but only the fair market value of the property is at issue (which is the real thrust of
plaintiffs' case), a review by the planning commission seems inane. Section 17-27-204 gives the
planning commission power to review and make or offer recommendations to the county
commission regarding land use and zoning changes, not to opine upon the property's fair market
value.
Finally, to render all parts of § 305 relevant and meaningful, as proper statutory
construction requires, this court must construe both subsections (1) and (2) of § 305 together in a
way that harmonizes their underlying intent. See Platts v. Parents Helping Hands, 947 P.2d 658,
662 (Utah 1997) (holding that courts must construe statutory language so as to render all parts
relevant, meaningful, and operative); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, 854 P.2d 513,
518 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted) ("[I]f doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or
application of an act's provisions, the court should analyze the act in its entirety and 'harmonize
its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.'"); Jensen v. Intermountain
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Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted) ("[T]he meaning of a part
of an act should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts of an act should not
be construed in isolation from the rest of the act."). In doing so, the preceding analysis persuades
the court, and the court rules as a matter of law, that the selling of real property in § 3 05 (2) (a)
means a selling that results in a land use change not in conformity to the plan. This
interpretation renders subsection (2)(b) relevant and meaningful to the whole section. Changes in
land use in the specific activities enumerated in subsection (2)(a), not in conformity with the
plan, necessitate an amendment to the general plan, consistent with subsection (l)(a) and (l)(b).
A change in ownership per se in subsection (2)(a) does not trigger a need for amendment to the
plan under (2)(b), as plaintiffs contend, because there is nothing to amend under the plan.
Plaintiffs' interpretation ignores the legislative intent of the entire section and of the act as a
whole, both of which deal clearly with land use, not ownership.
Concluding this point, the county's sale of the property to Jones did not change the
recreational use of the property under the plan; accordingly, the act did not require the county to
provide public notices and hearings before selling the property. In the future, however, if Jones
wishes to use the property for any purpose inconsistent with the plan, he will need to seek a land
use change, requiring notices to the public, hearings before the planning commission and the
county commission, and a plan amendment as required by § 305.
B. No Constitutional Requirement of Notice and Hearing
Plaintiffs assert that the citizens of Weber County have a constitutional right to notice and
hearing, which lie at the heart of procedural fairness, before the sale of public land to Jones, and
that the county's failure to give them notice and hearing deprived them of due process. They rely
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on W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990), an
eminent domain case involving the Neighborhood Development Act. Plaintiffs here argue that
the case stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations is not triggered when notice is
not given to the public. W. & G. is distinguishable from the case before this court and is
inapposite because, first, unlike the plaintiffs in W. & G., the plaintiffs in this case do not have a
specific, individual interest in the property. The plaintiffs in W. & G. owned the property that
was being condemned; thus, any taking without strict compliance with actual notice would be an
unconstitutional taking without due process. Second, state law mandates precise statutory
requirements for taking property under the power of eminent domain in W. & G.; however, in
this case no statutory requirements exist for notice and hearing before the sale of county surplus
real property. Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 960
P.2d 907, 210 (Utah App. 1998), expressly declined to extend W. & G. to a process not affecting
individual property interests. Likewise, plaintiffs' reliance on Longley v. Leucadia Financial
Corp., 2000 Utah 69, 9 P.3d 762 (Utah 2000) before the Utah Supreme Court is misplaced.
Foremost, both decisions are based on strict compliance with statutory requirements for
published notice. No statutory notice requirements exist in the instant case. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Howe's concurring opinion addresses the constitutional issue of due process:
While Longley's constitutional right to due process may not have been violated,
the statute above mentioned clearly gives him the right to a published notice that
will inform the public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request.
Thus it is a statutory right, not a constitutional right, which has been violated.
Id. at H 29, emphasis added.
In summary of this point, all of the cases that plaintiffs cite as authority for their position
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involve an express statutory requirement for notice, where none exists in this case. Plaintiffs have
no constitutional right to notice and hearing because they have no personal, vested interest in the
property sold to Jones.
CONCLUSION
The court is sympathetic with plaintiffs' position that it is desirable that sales of publicly
owned real property occur openly, through meaningful notices and hearings to the public, and
perhaps that is a matter that the legislature ought to review. However, this court may not
substitute its judgment for the legislature's and impose a requirement of notice and hearing
where none exits under the law. This court has the responsibility to interpret the law only and
then to follow it.
Under Utah law, the county has broad authority to determine how it will administer and
sell publicly owned surplus real property. The law imposes no express or implied statutory
requirement of notice and hearing before the sale of such property. As such, there was no
requirement of public notice and hearing connected with the county's sale of surplus real
property to Rulon Jones beyond the posting of the county commission's agenda, which included
the sale of the property, and the public meeting before the county commissioners in which the
sale of the property was discussed and approved. Further, the plaintiffs do not have any personal
vested interest in the property upon which they can base a constitutional due process claim of
right to notice and hearing.
The notice and hearing requirements that the plaintiffs contend the county violated deal
with notices and hearings that must occur before the county authorizes changes in land use that
do not conform the county's general plan. The general plan serves as an advisory guide for
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community decisions in real property development and land use policies. It is concerned only
with land use, to ensure the orderly and responsible development of real property, not with land
ownership, as plaintiffs assert. The county's sale of the property to Jones did not change the
recreational use of the property under the county's general plan. Accordingly, state law did not
require the county to provide public notice and hearing before selling the property.
Finally, plaintiffs' claims are barred by the running of the statutory period provided in the
act in which the plaintiffs seek judicial review of the county's conveyance of the property to
Jones. No factual or legal basis exists to toll the running of this limitation period.
Therefore, the court dismisses the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Mr. Burnett, in
consort with Mr. Houtz, may prepare appropriate findings of undisputed fact, conclusions of law,
and an order or judgment for the court's signature.
Dated this ffQ day of December, 2000.

Michael D. Lyon, Judge f
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the^/ 9 day of December, 2000,1 sent a true and coiTect copy of
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Robert B. Sykes
Robert B. Sykes & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
311 South Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2320
Jody K. Burnett
Williams & Hunt
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Attorneys for Weber County
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Michael V. Houtz
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones
Attorneys for Rulon Jones
4605 Harrison Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84403-7000
David C. Wilson
Deputy Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 230
Ogden, Utah 84401-1464
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Attorneys for Weber County Defendants
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BEN P. TOONE, KENT D. FULLER,
ROBERT J. FULLER, HAYNES R. FULLER
and ROGER E. CANNON,
Plaintiffs,
v.

:
:
:
:

WEBER COUNTY, a political subdivision, the
WEBER COUNTY COMMISSION and
COMMISSIONERS GLEN BURTON, KEN
BISCHOFF and CAMTLLE CATNE, MARK
DeCARIA, Weber County Attorney, RULON
JONES, an individual, and JOHN & JANE
DOES 1-10,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

3 1 2001

Civil No. 990907314PR
:

Judge Michael D. Lyon

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

This matter came before the above-entided Court, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon
presiding, for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment submitted on behalf of
plaintiffs and defendants. The Court heard oral argument on a number of occasions,
including January 13, 2000, February 24, 2000, May 18, 2000, and most recendy on
November 21, 2000. In addition, the Court held several telephone conferences with

counsel for the parties. Plaintiffs were represented by Robert B. Sykes. The Weber County
defendants were represented by Jody K Burnett. Defendant Rulon Jones was represented
by Michael V. Houtz.
Following the conclusion of the briefing and hearing schedule, the Court took the
matter under advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits
submitted by the parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised, issued its Memorandum Decision dated December 29, 2000. Pursuant to that
Memorandum Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as
follows:
1.

The motions for summary judgment on behalf of the Weber County

defendants and defendant Rulon Jones are hereby granted. The Court finds that there are
no genuine issues as to any material facts and that the defendants are entided to summary
judgment on the claims asserted in the plaintiffs3 Amended Complaint as a matter of law on
the grounds more fully set forth in the Memorandum Decision of December 29, 2000,
which is incorporated by this reference.
2.

The plaintiffs5 cross-motion for summary judgment is hereby denied for the

reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision of December 29, 2000.
3.

Based on the judicial admission of defendants Weber County and Jones, the

right-of-way was not conveyed and remains with Weber County, as reflected in the original
conveyance to the county.
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4.

Based on the foregoing orders and for the reasons more fully set forth above,

the plaintiffs5 Amended Complaint, together with all claims or legal theories as set forth
therein, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this fitf day of January, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Mtml ft
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Michael D. Lyon
District Court Judge
Anproval as to Form:

Robert B. Syke7
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Michkel V. Houtz
Attorney for Defendant Rulon Jones
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